Introduction
The local government system in Ghana is premised on the assumptions that development must respond to people's problems and represent objectives and priorities; and that responsibility for development is shared by central government, local governments, parastatals, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the people as the ultimate beneficiaries of development. District assembly financing resources are thus essential to enable local governments to translate their powers and competences into development activities.
The financial provisions for Ghana's local government system are contained in Section 27, Parts IV and VIII of the Local Government Law 1988; in the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) Law 207; and in Articles 245 and 252 of the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana (Government of Ghana 1988 Ghana , 1992 Ghana , 1993 Ghana and 2003 . In this regard, revenues for decentralised government agencies (ie Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) are broadly classified as internally generated funds (IGF), District Development Facility (DDF) grants and central government transfers (grants-in-aid and ceded revenue). The introduction of the District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF), under which 7.5% of the national budget is allocated to districts, has further strengthened the framework of local government in Ghana.
To strengthen the financing base of MMDAs, the Local Government Act 1993 (No. 462 ) allows MMDAs to raise revenue locally for the purpose of undertaking independent development projects without needing to rely on central government support or other external sources of funding. However, research has shown that over the years MMDAs have not been able to do this effectively. Empirical studies have shown that more than 60% of revenues for MMDAs have come from central government and partner sources. Osei-Akoto et al. (2007) found that between 1994 and 2004 IGF constituted an average of just 31.8% of MMDA revenue, whereas nearly 60% came from other sources (eg grants from development partners, the DACF and the DDF). Furthermore, in 2006 Ghana's Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Environment indicated that IGF for MMDAs stood at 18% of revenues, compared to central government grants at 82% (cited in Appiah-Agyekum et al. 2013 ). This implies a wide gap between revenues generated internally and those coming from external sources.
MMDAs' inability to generate substantial internal revenues for development projects is a national problem, but it appears to be particularly acute in the Northern Region. IGF statistics for the past five years in the Region show consistent budget deficits due to inadequate generation of IGF by MMDAs.
The average revenue performance of the Northern Region on IGF stood at 74% of budgeted and other external sources to finance their development projects. But this reliance typically delays the implementation of their Medium Term Development Plans (MTDPs). Funding often fails to meet budgeted requirements, which means that development projects are not completed on schedule or often left uncompleted. It is thus crucial for MMDAs to mobilise locally generated funds, in order to implement development plans without needing to rely on central government and development partners. In this light, this study seeks to explore why MMDAs in the Northern Region have difficulty in meeting IGF targets.
Objectives
The paper has four main objectives: i) to assess the sources of IGF for MMDAs; ii) to document the strategies employed by assemblies in generating revenue locally; iii) to analyse the effectiveness of these strategies; and iv) to examine the challenges encountered by the assemblies in mobilising the funds they need.
Literature review
This section discusses relevant literature on IGF mobilisation, including conceptual and empirical frameworks.
Conceptual framework
The concept of IGF is defined variously by authors. According to Kazentet (2011) an internally generated fund (IGF) consists of funds collected exclusively by or for sub-national governments.
Operationally, IGF is revenue that is directly generated by district assemblies (DAs) within their areas of jurisdiction, and as such is the only revenue over which DAs have absolute control (how and where it is spent). The sources of IGF as spelt out by Lutaya and West (2009) and Adu-Gyamfi (2014) the extent to which the general public is aware of the need to pay and co-operate in paying fees, taxes, or rates, and the extent of corruption associated with IGF structures and mobilisation. 
Empirical framework
Various studies have been conducted on the success of local authorities in Ghana (ie MMDAs) in mobilising IGF to undertake development projects. One such study is that of Abura-AsebuKwamankese District Assembly in the 2011/12 fiscal year by Dick-Sagoe (2012) . He established that the assembly did not meet its revenue targets partly due to a lack of the required staffing and skills, and partly due to a lack of innovation on the part of the assembly. This situation was not unique to Abura-Asebu-Kwamankese District Assembly, but was also found in Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly, which had been expected to do well in terms of IGF generation because they have a large revenue pool (Dick-Sagoe 2012).
In another study, Alupungu et al. (2012) found that IGF for the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly in the 2011/12 fiscal year constituted just 12% of total revenue, implying an even wider gap between IGF and external sources for all MMDAs. This abysmal performance was attributed to citizens' lack of awareness of the need to pay taxes to the assembly, as well as to inadequate logistics and lack of motivation by revenue collectors.
Agyapong (2012), in a study of Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly, further found that revenues mobilised could not finance the infrastructure needed, finding that the shortfall of revenue was mainly due to corruption amongst revenue collectors, officers and assemblymen in the various Sub-Metro
Districts. The study concluded that Kumasi was not harnessing fiscal decentralisation enough to empower itself under the Local Government Act 1993, with the result that the assembly had not developed new and sustainable strategies to improve its performance in revenue mobilisation. The assembly, like many local authorities in Ghana, was over-reliant on the DACF to meet its capital expenditure, while much of its IGF went on administrative costs.
The difficulty local authorities face in raising local revenue to undertake development projects is not peculiar to Ghana. Buettner and Wildasin (2006) found that in the United States an increase in external grants to local governments led to reduced own-revenue generation.
In Nigeria, a study by Chukwuma in 2010 noted that the most crucial challenge to local authorities in Nigeria in mobilising IGF was their inability to raise, retain and manage revenues. This was attributed to instability within the political system, the absence of structured institutions for raising IGF, and the unsustainability of identified sources of IGF. Nevertheless, there have been a few successes in Nigeria. Adesoji and Chike (2013) established that IGF had contributed significantly to the infrastructure development in Lagos State. The main strategies employed in mobilising IGF by Lagos
State were enforcement by penalising non-payers, training of tax personnel, and awareness-raising among the general public -the potential taxpayers -about their responsibility to pay.
In conclusion, the literature suggests that IGF mobilisation is a problem for local authorities in developing countries generally, and Ghana is no exception. Most assemblies in Ghana are over-reliant on central government transfers (notably the DACF) and external sources to finance development projects. This study now turns to the question of why MMDAs are unable to mobilise the needed revenue.
Study area and methodology
This section briefly describes the study area and the methodology employed in collecting data.
The study area
The Northern Region is an administrative region of Ghana, with Tamale as its capital. It is the largest Region in Ghana in terms of land area, at about 70,384 km 2 (29% of the country's total land area). 
Research design
As this paper aims to assess the effectiveness of IGF mobilisation by MMDAs, a research design was adopted that is both descriptive and cross-sectional, using qualitative and quantitative data to yield verbal and numerical pictures, and uncover information which can stimulate new explanations to contradict or support prior beliefs about a subject (Neuman, 1997; Sarantakos, 2005) . The combination of descriptive and cross-sectional elements aimed to expose any differences of views and dynamics between the various study populations. Collection of both primary and secondary data enabled the researchers to identify and describe the effectiveness of IGF mobilisation by MMDAs in Tamale Metropolis, Yendi Municipality and Saboba District, giving a snapshot of the situation as it existed when the study was conducted.
Sources of data
Primary data was gathered from administrative staff, IGF collectors and tax or ratepayers within the selected MMDAs. Secondary data was sourced from MMDA reports, mainly annual reports on IGF targets and mobilisation activities. The secondary sources helped to identify relevant information on the conceptual issues, and to identify research gaps to guide the primary data needed.
Study population and sample size
The study captured three categories of respondents, all of whom had day-to-day roles in IGF mobilisation within the selected MMDAs ( Table 2 ). The total sample size for the study was 279, with the breakdown of respondents in Table 3 . 
Data collection tools and techniques
The researcher used a structured questionnaire and a series of guided focus groups to collect primary data from the three categories of respondents. First, the questionnaire was pre-tested in two other Northern Region districts: Savelugu-Nanton Municipal Assembly and Kumbungu District Assembly.
These pilots were analysed and tested for reliability using Cronbach's 'alpha' test. The test value was 0.832, indicating a good level of internal consistency (over 80%), suggesting that a similar level of reliability might be achieved in another setting.
The questionnaire was then used to collect data from revenue collectors and tax and rate payers, as well as data on the strategies employed by assemblies in mobilising IGF, the effectiveness of these strategies, and the challenges faced by MMDAs in IGF mobilisation. Respondents were engaged in face-to-face interviews and answers given on the structured questionnaire.
Focus groups were also used to gather in-depth data from core administrative MMDA staff with relevant knowledge on sources of IGF, strategies for IGF mobilisation, effectiveness of these strategies and their challenges. Issues raised in the questionnaire interviews were also further clarified through focus group discussions. Three focus groups were held, one for each assembly, with seven participants in each, ie 21 staff in total. The groups were facilitated by the study authors to ensure discussion remained on topic.
Sampling methods
A multi-stage sampling technique was employed to select respondents from the three research categories.
First, a stratified sampling technique was used to identify zonal, town or area councils within each district. This enabled respondents to be fairly represented across the various area, zonal, town and urban councils in the selected MMDAs. Secondly, a purposive sampling technique was used to select zonal, town and area councils with revenue-raising potential -eg availability of businesses, rateable properties etc.
Thirdly, a random sampling technique was used to select IGF collector respondents. This was to ensure that each IGF collector was given an equal and non-zero chance of being selected. Once the list of collectors was compiled and names serially arranged, numbers were written on pieces of paper up to the number of IGF collectors per area/zonal/town/urban council, placed in a black polythene bag and mixed. The researchers then dipped their hands alternately into the bag to pick out the required number of IGF collectors to be sampled per area/zonal/town/urban council. The selection was done without replacement -ie each time a number was selected it was not put back into the bag. All numbers selected were then matched to their corresponding IGF collector name on the list.
A 'convenience' sampling technique was used to select respondents with obligations to pay IGF, since no detailed list of this category of respondents was available. Finally, a purposive sampling technique was used to select assembly administrative staff for inclusion.
Results and discussion
This section analyses and discusses the field data collected, according to the thematic areas addressed in the paper. These are: sources of IGF, collection strategies and their effectiveness, and collection challenges confronting the district assemblies under study.
Sources of IGF
The sources of IGF identified by the field data were similar to those spelt out in the Local Government Act 1993 and those found by earlier researchers (Lutaya and West 2009; Kazentet 2011; Agyapong 2012; Alupungu et al. 2012 ; and Adu-Gyamfi 2014) (see Table 1 ). This suggests a potentially wide revenue pool for MMDAs in the region, since they are entitled to collect revenue from multiple sources.
Strategies for mobilising IGF
The field data showed that all the district assemblies had strategies for mobilising revenue (Table 4) . As the table shows, interestingly, the strategies appear to be similar across the three assemblies except for a few which are peculiar to Tamale Metropolis. These could be attributed to its urban character, which offers relatively greater revenue potential than exists in other districts. The IGF mobilisation strategies used by the assemblies corroborate findings by Adesoji and Chike (2013) , who identified enforcement by tax personnel, increasing contributions, and awareness-raising among the general public as strategies adopted in Nigeria for effective IGF mobilisation by Federal States.
However, further enquiry and analysis indicated that the strategies employed by the assemblies did not enable them to mobilise enough revenue to undertake development projects. In this regard, the majority (63%) of respondents rated the strategies employed by the assemblies as insufficient, citing as reasons assemblies' lack of an effective revenue management system and lack of staff capacity.
Responses indicated a view that the available sources of IGF were quite extensive, but were inadequately exploited by the assemblies.
Effectiveness of strategies for IGF mobilisation
Respondents were asked to assess the effectiveness of strategies used by MMDAs in mobilising revenue for the 2013 fiscal year. As an introductory question, respondents, mainly assembly staff and revenue collectors, were asked whether their assembly set revenue targets or not. Source: Field data 2014
As Table 5 indicates, the majority (76%) of respondents (mostly assembly staff and revenue collectors) said that their assembly sets annual revenue targets. Thus, it would appear that the assemblies do set targets, with planned strategies to achieve the targets, but these are imperfectly communicated to tax payers, as about 24% of respondents had no knowledge of the taxation process.
This indicates that many people, particularly revenue-payers, still do not know much about the collection processes for IGF, although this may include an element of tax dodging. Table 6 outlines the revenue targets of the three assemblies. As shown in Table 6 , Yendi Municipality had the highest IGF target: GH¢6,246,161.00 (approximately US$ 1.5 million at current rates), followed by Tamale Metropolis, and finally Saboba District with the lowest target (GH¢84,614.50). Yendi's revenue target of about 80% of the total revenue of the three MMDAs may be due to their 2012 IGF performance. The IGF targets were to be achieved using strategies identified by the assemblies. This study sought to establish whether the revenue targets were achieved, with the results shown in Table 7 . In spite of the numerous sources of revenue available to the selected assemblies, their fiscal performances were below expectation. Yendi did better than the rest, and were able to mobilise almost twice the revenue of Tamale, possibly because revenue collectors were given bonuses if they met certain revenue targets in a month. Yendi
Metropolitan Assembly also used revenue thresholds, and used a special tax force to collect the revenue.
Challenges of mobilising IGF
Earlier researchers such as Kelly (1995) , Boachie-Danquah (1996) , King et al. (2003) , Nicol (2005) and Agyapong (2012) established a number of challenges confronting MMDAs in effectively mobilising IGF. These included lack of adequate IGF databases, weak monitoring, under-declaration by revenue collectors, corruption, and lack of trained personnel. These challenges are similar to those established by this study (Table 8) . 
Summary
The paper established that there are various sources from which the studied MMDAs could raise IGF (Table 1 ). The paper also revealed that the MMDAs under consideration employed various strategies to do this (shown in Table 4 ). Despite these strategies, however, the assemblies could not meet their revenue targets for the 2013 fiscal year, which suggests that the strategies were not robust or effective.
Furthermore, the study found that the general public was not well informed about the rationale for paying rates and charges, which fuelled a perception among respondents that IGF mobilisation by the assemblies had no impact on local-level development. In this light, about 71% of tax and rate payers strongly indicated that they did not feel the benefits of any taxes they paid to the assembly and that was why they did not feel any responsibility to pay such taxes. The study nevertheless revealed that a majority (66%) of respondents acknowledged that the behaviour of those with charge-paying obligations was very poor, suggesting that the problem was deliberate avoidance, rather than ignorance of the need to pay rates or taxes, partly due to their sense that IGF revenues do not translate into local development.
The study also documented a strong perception among the public that there exists corruption in revenue collection processes. This was attributed to poor supervision by the assembly authorities.
Finally, the study documented various challenges confronting the assemblies in their efforts to effectively raise revenues (Table 8) .
Conclusion
Based on the above analysis, it can be concluded that the MMDAs in the Northern Region of Ghana do in principle have access to sources of IGF. However, the assemblies studied cannot meet their annual revenue targets, due to inadequate logistics, under-declaring of revenues by revenue collectors, poor supervision and monitoring, and poor compliance by those residents who are liable for local taxes, rates and charges.
